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Abstract
A large negative stock price reaction to a restatement announcement could imply
a particularly significant accounting error, or one made by a firm that has a relatively
high probability of being sued. This paper investigates the extent to which market
reactions to restatement announcements are explained by litigation risk. We model the
simultaneous relationship between restatement announcement abnormal returns and
litigation risk and find that about half of the -9.2 percent average restatement
announcement effect is due to expected litigation costs. We also find that the significance
of the accounting error does not directly affect the magnitude of the abnormal return; it
only affects abnormal return indirectly because it increases the probability of being sued.

JEL classification: G14, G30
Keywords: Corporate misreporting, financial statement restatements, valuation, dummy
endogenous variable model
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1. Introduction
The growing number of financial statement restatements and their associated
shareholder losses have motivated new regulations such as Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 20022
and the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) earnings management initiative
(Berton (2000), Public Accounting Report (1998)). This paper studies the marginal effect
of litigation on restatement announcement return; i.e. whether restating firms’ stocks
suffer such large losses because the market is surprised by particularly egregious
accounting mistakes, or because admitting to the mistakes increases the likelihood that
firms will face large litigation costs. We show that litigation risk accounts for about half
of the average -9.2 percent restatement announcement abnormal return. Our paper
contributes to the literature by estimating the marginal effect of litigation using two
dummy endogenous variable models. The models can be used to find the embedded
marginal effect of litigation risk for other events including seasoned equity offerings,
debt issuances, large negative earnings surprises, insider trading, and fraud revelations.
There are several reasons why it is important to isolate the marginal effect of
litigation. First, policymakers are interested in the magnitude of the shareholder harm
caused by the misinformation, which firms correct in the restatement. Because we find
that half of the announcement return is due to a firm’s “suability” as opposed to the
seriousness of its accounting errors, less stringent regulatory remedies could be
appropriate. Similarly, the debate on tort reform could benefit from our evidence that
litigation risk accounts for half of shareholder losses at restatement announcement.
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Report Pursuant to Section 704 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 specifically says: “The past year has
been marked by a series of restatements of financial statements by prominent corporations resulting in
billions of dollars lost by investors. To address concerns raised by these restatements, and to restore public
trust in the U.S. financial markets, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act”), which the President signed into law on July 30, 2002.”
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Second, the stock loss at restatement announcement is often used to estimate
damages in class action lawsuits and in academic literature that tries to establish whether
class action lawsuits have merit (Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2007), Iqbal, Shetty, and
Wang (2007)). Our analysis shows that using the full loss overstates shareholder damages
due to restatement because it implicitly includes greater litigation costs for firms that are
more sueable. Third, financial analysts should be interested in disentangling the effects
since litigation costs are one-time costs while the rest of the announcement effects may
be related to ongoing operations. Lastly, short-sellers who trade in anticipation of
restatements can use our results to gauge when stocks have fallen far enough to warrant
covering their short sale.
Several studies find that restating firms suffer an average of up to a ten percent
abnormal stock price decline over a two day window surrounding restatement
announcements.3 While these studies seem to imply that large negative restatement
announcement returns are mostly due to new negative financial information, they do not
account for the substantial litigation costs that often follow.
Other studies contain hints that litigation risk could partly explain restatement
announcement returns. Jones and Weingram (1997) search for stocks that fall more than
10 percent in a single day and find that those involved in restatements, insider trading,
seasoned equity offerings, SEC enforcement actions, or fall-triggering announcements
are more likely to be sued in class actions (Rule 10b-5)4. Jones and Weingram (1997) and
Bradley, Cline, and Lian (2010) find that restating firms are substantially more likely to
3

See Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz (2004), Durnev and Mangen (2009), and others.
Securities class action lawsuits filed under Rule 10b-5 allege material flaws pertaining to firms’
disclosure. Allegedly, firms’ misstatements cause inflation in the stock price during the class action period.
Most of these lawsuits are filed on behalf of shareholders who bought the stock during the period of alleged
inflated stock prices and believe they are entitled to compensation.
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be sued than other firms. Palmrose and Scholz (2004) find that 37.6 percent of restating
companies are sued. Lowry and Shu (2002) show that initial public offerings are
underpriced, at least partly to reduce litigation risk. But only six percent of the firms in
their sample are sued. A much larger proportion of our restating firms are sued, enabling
us to produce more precise estimates of the magnitude of expected litigation costs.
Several studies examine the characteristics of firms with high litigation risk, and
how investors account for such characteristics at the time of a corrective disclosure that
leads to litigation (Jones and Weingram (2005), Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper (1994)).
In general, they find that high litigation risk firms are identifiable. Hence, investors
should be able to anticipate the cost and the probability of a class action lawsuit at the
time of the restatement announcement. In fact, Gande and Lewis (2009) find that the
more likely a firm is to be sued, the larger is the anticipation effect by the market and the
smaller is the filing date effect. We find a similar effect for restatements. We show that
the stock prices of more “sueable” firms start falling a month before their restatement
announcements.
Using model specifications that control for the endogeneity of restatement
announcement return and litigation risk, we find that litigation risk is an important
determinant of market reactions to restatement announcements. This result is robust to
various specifications. A ten percent increase in the likelihood of litigation decreases
announcement period two-day cumulative abnormal return by approximately 1.42
percent.5 We estimate that roughly half (-4.8 percent) of the average -9.2 percent
announcement abnormal return is due to expected litigation costs. This corresponds to an

5

This estimate is made by averaging all coefficients on the proxy for litigation risk in all models in Tables
5, 6 and 7.
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average loss of $115 million in shareholder wealth at the announcement of a restatement,
$60 million of which is lost due to expected litigation costs.
Some firms’ stocks suffer particularly large declines because of more serious
restatements, such as those due to irregularity or those that affect core accounts. Our
method allows us to show that those issues increase the firms’ probability of being sued,
but provide little new information used by investors to reassess firms’ operating cash
flows. Apparently, by the time a restatement is announced, investors have already
inferred a good deal of the restatement information using other sources, which is
consistent with the findings of Bardos, Golec and Harding (2011). We show that a
substantial portion of the loss at the restatement announcement is due to details that allow
investors to better estimate the probability that a restating firm will be sued.6
Intentional mistakes could increase litigation risk more than unintentional
mistakes. Indeed, we control for this possibility by distinguishing between restatements
with and without irregularities. Prior studies suggest that plaintiff attorneys will pursue
the cases with the highest expected payoffs. Therefore, “deep pocket” firms that restate
due to a simple computation error can get sued, while empty pocket firms with
accounting irregularities might not. Even after controlling for the effect of irregularities,
our finding of a negative relation between restatement announcement period return and
the likelihood of litigation remains significant.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops hypotheses and
empirical methods. Section 3 describes explanatory variables that are included in our

6

While investors assess the probability of a firm being sued before a restatement is announced, that
probability is likely to be small if many firms manipulate earnings but never restate. When the firm admits
to the error and restates, the probability of a lawsuit jumps and stock price takes a large hit.
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model. The data are described in Section 4. Section 5 presents the results, and Section 6
concludes the paper.

2. The Issue, Hypothesis Development, and Empirical Methods
2.1. The issue illustrated
Figure 1 starkly illustrates the issue of this paper. Using our sample of restating
firms, Figure 1.A reproduces the typical pattern of abnormal returns observed in earlier
studies around restatement announcements. The average abnormal return on the day of
and the day following the restatement announcement is about -9 percent. But this masks
significant differences between sued and non-sued firms. Figure 1.B shows that average
two-day abnormal return of firms that were sued is much lower (about -20 percent) than
that of non-sued firms (about -4 percent). A -4 percent average market reaction to an
announcement is substantial, but an average -20 percent reaction for the sued firms
suggests that expected litigation costs could be relatively more important than the
seriousness of the accounting errors.
<<< Insert Figure 1 here >>>
Figure 1.B shows that the return pattern in Figure 1.A. is largely driven by the
restating firms that are sued. Compared to non-sued firms, sued firms’ shareholders start
to anticipate a costly problem well before the restatement announcement, and after a
sharp two day drop at the announcement, the total price decline is maintained or increases
somewhat. Non-sued firms’ show little pre-announcement effects and they recoup their
two day loses shortly after the announcement. The fleeting announcement effect for nonsued firms implies that any firm revaluation due to their restatements is minimal.

6

For sued firms, investors appear to sense financial weakness up to 30 days prior to
their restatements. Sued firms suffer -20 percent abnormal returns on average during the
period from day -30 through day -2, and suffer another -20 percent decline at restatement
announcement (days zero and plus one). Such a large negative market reaction after an
already substantial decline suggests either a surprisingly large accounting problem, or
that shareholders anticipate that the restatement itself could bring on large additional
costs, e.g., litigation costs. Although we find that sued firms commit somewhat more
serious accounting errors than non-sued firms, the magnitude and endurance of
restatement day abnormal returns for the sued firms is surprising.
To sort out the differential effect of litigation risk and the magnitude of the
accounting error, one must recognize that firms’ litigation risks and their restatementrelated abnormal returns are interdependent. Lawsuits present a major expense to
shareholders, therefore, more “sueable” restating firms should have more negative market
reactions to their restatement announcements, all else equal. On the other hand, Jones and
Weingram (1997) show that the likelihood of litigation is greater after large one day stock
price declines. Therefore, we model the relation between restatement announcement
returns and litigation risk as a simultaneous equations system.

2.2. Development of the hypothesis
A significant market reaction to a restatement occurs if it causes the marginal investor
to change his estimate of the net present value of future cash flows by either decreasing the
cash flows or increasing the cost of capital. This can happen because restatements can reveal
that past earnings were overstated and that predicted future earnings need a downward
revision, or because of the loss of credibility of financial statements. Indeed, previous studies

7

show that the majority of restatements correct net income downward (Palmrose, Richardson
and Scholz (2004), Bardos, Golec and Harding (2011)). Wilson (2008) finds that

information content of earnings declines temporarily after restatements. Hribar and
Jenkins (2004) show that analysts revise their estimates of growth rate downward
following restatements.7 Furthermore, prior literature shows that restating firms
experience high management turnover subsequent to restatement announcements and
worsening of employment prospects of managers (Desai et al. (2006), Srinivasan (2004),

Hennes, Miller, and Leone (2008)).8
Restatements also increase the likelihood of litigation. They increase the
likelihood of litigation more than equity issuance, insider trading, SEC enforcement
actions and other announcements that trigger ten percent or more drop in stock prices
(Jones and Weingram (1997), Bradley, Cline, and Lian (2010)). Indeed, Palmrose and
Scholz (2004) report that 37.6 percent of firms restating financial statements are sued
subsequent to restatement announcements.
Litigation is costly to firms. Palmrose and Scholz (2004) document that the mean
litigation resolution amount equals $50.3 million for a sample of firms that are sued as a
result of restatements during 1995 through 1999.9 We call these costs litigation resolution
costs. However, litigation resolution costs are only one portion of the total costs
associated with a lawsuit. There are other, potentially more important costs including
legal defense costs, lost reputation and the opportunity cost of management time
dedicated to lawsuits. Lost reputation is the loss of firm value due to changes of relations
7

They also find that the cost of capital increases following restatements. However, the validity of this
finding was questioned by Kasznik (2004) and others due to methodology concerns.
8
Similar results are found for a sample of firms subject to SEC and Department of Justice enforcement
actions for financial misrepresentation (Karpoff, Lee and Martin (2007), Karpoff, Lee and Martin (2008)).
9
This number represents strictly settlement costs paid to the litigants either as part of a settlement or as the
result of a court order.
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with investors, customers and suppliers (see Karpoff and Lott (1993)). We call these
costs indirect costs of litigation. Karpoff, Lee and Martin (2008) find that firms charged
by the SEC with financial misrepresentation face substantial reputation and legal costs,
with reputation loss costs exceeding legal costs by over 7.5 times.10
We hypothesize that investors at least partly assess expected litigation costs at the
time of restatement announcements, and react more negatively to restatement
announcements that are expected to result in higher total litigation costs.11 Therefore we
hypothesize that:
Litigation risk hypothesis: Firms with higher expected litigation costs suffer larger stock
price declines when they announce restatements.
Prior literature suggests that plaintiff attorneys pursue cases that maximize their
profit (Jones and Weingram (2005)). Moreover, Karpoff, Lee and Martin (2007) find that
legal penalties imposed by private class actions are positively related to the size and
severity of the damage to investors for the sample of firms that are subject to the SEC
enforcement actions. A class action lawsuit will be initiated only when expected litigation
resolution costs (profit to plaintiff and their attorneys) exceed some threshold. All else
equal, that threshold is more likely to be breached when the firm is more "sueable", for
example, if the firm has deep pockets. Hence, a significant negative relation between the
likelihood of litigation and restatement announcement abnormal returns is consistent with
the litigation risk hypothesis.

10

The authors define reputation costs as “the decrease in present value of the firm's cash flows as investors,
customers, and suppliers are expected to change the terms of trade with which they do business with the
firm,” page 2.
11
Gande and Lewis (2009) show that partial anticipation of lawsuits does not preempt negative market
reaction to the announcement of litigation.
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2.3. Description of empirical methods
The test of the litigation risk hypothesis is not trivial because the expected
likelihood of litigation is unobservable as are the expected costs associated with
litigation. We do, nonetheless, observe whether or not the firm is sued. Let Litigation=1
when the firm is sued as a result of a restatement announcement, and Litigation=0
otherwise. To measure the expected effect of litigation on announcement period returns,
we are interested in the expected difference in CAR01 with and without litigation.
Wooldridge (2002, page 604) calls this expectation the average treatment effect.12 If
Litigation were statistically independent of the difference between CARs with and
without litigation, then the difference in mean estimator for sub-samples with and without
litigation would be unbiased, consistent and asymptotically normal (Wooldridge (2002)).
But this condition is not realistic for restatements. The relation between the
market reaction to restatement announcements and litigation risk is endogenous. First,
investors should react to restatement announcements more negatively when they believe
that litigation risk is relatively high. Second, litigation risk has been shown to be higher
after large one day stock declines. The relation between CAR01 and litigation risk can be
expressed as the following system of equations.

CAR01 = γ1 Litigation risk + β1 X1 + ε1

12

Wooldridge (2002) defines the partial effect of

(1)

x j on the conditional expectation E(y|x) as the partial

derivative of E(y|x) with respect to x j . For example in a simple model where

E ( y | x1 , x 2 )   0   1 x1   2 x 2 , the partial effect of x1 is  1 . If y depends on both observable and
unobservable variables and the partial effect of x j is a function of unobservable variables, then the partial
effect of x j can be averaged across the population of unobservable variables to generate average partial
effects. Average treatment effect is the average partial effect for a binary variable.
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Litigation risk = γ2 CAR01 + β2 X2 + ε 2

(2)

The focus of this paper is to estimate equation (1) accounting for the endogeneity
of CAR01 and litigation risk. Because CAR01 and litigation risk are endogenous, it is not
correct to use ordinary least squares (OLS) to regress announcement abnormal returns on
explanatory variables and a dummy variable proxy for litigation risk. The ex post
occurrence of litigation is not exogenous, hence, the OLS assumption of independence of
the error term and explanatory variables is violated.
Because the only endogenous explanatory variable in equation (1) is binary,
equation (1) is called a dummy endogenous variable model (Heckman (1978)). The
estimate of the coefficient γ 1 in equation (1) is called the average treatment effect. It can
be estimated using an instrumental variable approach (Wooldridge (2002), Angrist
(2001)). This approach requires at least one instrumental variable that we denote by the
vector Z. Z is a member of X2 but not X1.13
Wooldridge (2002) shows that parameters in equation (1) can be consistently
estimated by the following procedure (Wooldridge (2002) page 623 procedure 18.1).14
The first step estimates the probability of litigation using a probit model:
Probability(Litigation = 1| X). Here, X is the union of X 1 and X 2 .15 The resulting model
is used to generate the predicted probability of being sued for each restating firm,
^

denoted G i . The next step estimates the system of equations (1) and (2) using two-stage

13

We discuss our choice of instrumental variable in section 3.
This procedure has been used to study other finance problems. Adams, Almeida and Ferreira (2009)
study the effect of performance on founder-CEO status. Zhu (2009) examines the effect of litigation risk on
SEO performance.
15
Recall that Z is a member of X2.
14
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least squares (2SLS). The first stage is a regression of the litigation dummy variable on
^

G i and X. This generates a second version of the predicted probability of litigation,
^

which we denote as P (Litigation). The second stage of the 2SLS procedure estimates
^

equation (1) by OLS after substituting P (Litigation) for Litigation and obtaining 2SLS
standard errors (Wooldridge (2002) and Zhu (2009)).
There are several advantages to using this method (Adams, Almeida and Ferreira
(2009)). First, unlike other instrumental variable models such as 2SLS, it takes into
consideration the binary nature of the litigation variable. Moreover, the logit model does
not have to be correctly specified. Furthermore, there are no special problems (e.g., need
to adjust standard errors) in estimating equation (1) in this manner when the endogenous
variable is binary (Wooldridge (2002)). The estimated coefficients in equation (1) are
consistent and asymptotically normal. We call this approach Method 1.
When the purpose is to estimate only equation (1), Heckman (1978) recommends
a simpler method for the estimation of dummy endogenous variable models. One can
estimate a linear probability model with Litigation as a dependent variable. The
independent variables should include all of the variables in X 1 and X2. As long as X2
contains at least one variable not included in X1, the model is identified and the predicted
values of Litigation can be used as regressors in the second stage estimation of equation
(1) because the regression residuals from the prediction of Litigation are constructed to
be orthogonal to X 1 . Standard instrumental variables results apply because it is not
necessary to obtain consistent estimators of the parameters of reduced form equations in
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order to consistently estimate structural equations (Heckman (1978)). We call this
approach Method 2.16
Although Wooldridge (2002) suggests that his method produces estimates that
are consistent under less restrictive conditions than Heckman’s (1978) method, we find
similar results for both. Therefore, we present the full results for Method 1, and simply
discuss the results for Method 2 in section 5. The next section describes the explanatory
variables and their measurements.

3. Description of explanatory variables
To identify which variables affect the market reaction to restatement
announcements, we consider the impact of restatements on changes in future company
prospects, as well as the uncertainty of achieving them. This approach relies on
discounted cash flow valuation in which stock price is determined as the present value of
expected future cash flows. To identify which variables affect the likelihood of class
action lawsuits, we assume that plaintiffs consider both the size of the damage and the
likelihood of collection, as has been argued by Jones and Weingram (2005).
To identify the system of equations, we need one or more variables that influence
the probability of litigation but does not directly affect the announcement abnormal
return. We use share turnover prior to the restatement announcements to play this role.
Share turnover prior to restatement is a good candidate for litigation instrument because it
16

The system of equations (1) and (2) also can be estimated using the method discussed in Maddala (1983,
page 244).16 We employ Wooldridge’s approach because it has two advantages over Maddala’s. First, it
allows recovering of coefficients in equations (1) and (2), while Maddala’s approach does not (Maddala
(1983), Lowry and Shu (2002), Zhu (2009)). Since the main focus of our paper is to estimate the marginal
effect of expected litigation costs on restatement announcement returns, it is important for us to be able to
recover the coefficients. Second, it offers estimators that are more efficient (Zhu (2009), Wooldridge
(2002)).

13

serves as a direct input in trading models that estimate damages in class action lawsuits
(Gande and Lewis (2009)). Since the specific harmed trades made during class action
periods are not observed, plaintiffs estimate the number of shares harmed by alleged
misinformation as a function of total share turnover using various methods known as
trading models (Barclay and Torchio (2001)).17
To establish damages, a shareholder must have bought shares at a price that
reflects misstated earnings and sold after price adjusts following the restatement. Higher
share turnover could, therefore, increase the probability that some shareholders bought
shares based on misleading information and sold later after the restatement. At the same
time, higher share turnover can indicate lower probability that shares bought after
misleading information was releases were held until the announcement of a restatement.
This would suggest a negative association of share turnover and shareholder damages. In
theory, therefore, turnover and the probability of a lawsuit could be negatively or
positively related. However, earlier studies by Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper (1994),
Gande and Lewis (2009), Field, Lowry, and Shu (2005), Files, Swanson and Tse (2009)
and Dyl (1999) have found that the net effect of turnover on litigation probability is
positive and significant. For our goal of identifying a valid instrument, we only require
that turnover and the probability of litigation are significantly related.
Ignoring the lawsuit effect, the announcement of a restatement should change
price only if the marginal investor changes her expectation of the present value of the
firm’s future cash flows. Assuming no lawsuit, share turnover prior to restatement

17

In results not reported we also use stock price volatility as an instrument since it is also used as an input
in some models. However, this variable is not significant in explaining the likelihood of litigation and
therefore is not a good instrument. Including stock price volatility in the first stage model in either method
does not affect the rest of the results.
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announcement should not influence announcement period returns. While it is always
difficult to find an instrumental variable that is orthogonal to the dependent variable in
the second equation, we feel that share turnover is a particularly strong candidate because
it is used by law firms as a direct input in damage calculations. Share turnover has been
used in Lowry and Shu (2002) as an instrument for litigation risk in a system of equations
where the second endogenous variable is the initial return following an IPO.
Share turnover can be viewed as a proxy for the probability that a share was
traded within a given time period. Following prior literature, share turnover is calculated
as: [1- Пt (1- volume tradedt / total sharest)] accumulated over the one-year period ending
on the second day prior to the restatement announcement date (Пt denotes product over
period t).18
There are several variables that are common to both equations (1) and (2) (i.e.,
that belong to both X1 and X2). The seriousness of the restatement should affect both the
likelihood of litigation and the announcement period returns. Holding other factors
constant, restatements of core accounts, such as revenue and cost, are considered more
serious than non-core account restatements. We use an indicator variable, Core, which
equals one if the restatement involves revenue, cost of sales or operating expense
accounts for on-going operations to control for the seriousness of the restatement.
Restating firms in our sample also restate non-core accounts such as securities-related
items (e.g., accounting for derivatives, warrants, stock options and convertible securities),

18

We reestimate our model using alternative estimation windows for share turnover. The results of the first
stage models appear to be sensitive to those changes but not the second stage model, which is our focus.
We chose to use (-252; -2) estimation window relative to restatement because it is consistent with both
practice in estimating losses and previous literature. Please refer to Table 1 for precise definition of all
variables.

15

in-process research and development (IPR&D), reclassifications, and related party
transactions. For restatements of non-core accounts, we set Core equal to zero.
We expect restatements of core accounts to be positively associated with the
likelihood of litigation and negatively associated with CAR01. This is consistent with
previous research which finds that more persistent operating income is associated with
stronger market reactions (Kormendi and Lipe (1987)). Several studies have also shown
that the market reacts more strongly to surprises in on-going operating income than to
one-time special items (Elliott and Hanna (1996), Strong and Meyer (1987)). Palmrose
and Scholz (2004) find that firms that restate core or revenue accounts have a higher
likelihood of litigation.
Some events leading to restatements could make it easier for the plaintiffs to win
the lawsuit, increasing their propensity to bring a lawsuit. It is easier for lawyers to argue
the intent to mislead if a third party initiates a restatement. To capture this effect, we
include indicator variables for the party attributed with identifying the misstatement
(Auditor, SEC, or Company). Managements’ integrity and competence are called into
question if a restatement is initiated by a third party. As a result, the Auditor and SEC
dummies should be negatively related to CAR01, while the Company dummy should be
positively related to CAR01. Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz’s (2004) results support
our expectations for the effects of Auditor.
Restatements that have more substantial impacts on previously reported financial
statements should result in a higher likelihood of litigation and more negative CAR01.
We measure the magnitude of the impact of restatements using variables suggested by
prior studies (Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz (2004), Palmrose and Scholz (2004) and
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Files, Swanson and Tse (2009)). Change in NI/Total_assets is the difference between
average annual restated Net Income and average annual originally reported Net Income
divided by total assets reported for the fiscal year preceding the restatement
announcement.19 We also include an indicator variable NI crosses loss threshold, which
takes a value of one if the restatement changes reported income into a loss and zero
otherwise. Another variable that measures the significance of a restatement is the Number

of periods restated, which equals the sum of periods restated, where a fiscal year=1 and
each additional quarter=0.25. Change in NI/Total_assets should be positively related to

CAR01 and negatively related to the likelihood of litigation. Number of periods restated
and NI crosses loss threshold should be negatively related to CAR01 and positively
related to the likelihood of litigation.
We include the indicator variable No_details in both X1 and X2. No_details is an
indicator variable that equals one if full details about a restatement were not released in
the initial announcement. If the firm does not disclose all of the details of its restatement,
uncertainty regarding firm prospects increases more at the restatement announcement.
Moreover, it is likely that full details about more serious restatements will not be released
at the initial announcement of a restatement (Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz (2004)).
Therefore, this variable can proxy for seriousness of the restatement and should be
positively related to the likelihood of litigation and negatively related to restatement
announcement period returns.
Other variables unrelated to the seriousness of the accounting mistake could be
important. Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz (2004) suggest that markets should react

19

Our results remain robust to using the difference between total restated net income and total originally
reported net income scaled by absolute value of total originally reported net income.
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less negatively to negative announcements made by poor performing firms. Therefore,
we include the firm’s pre-restatement stock performance, measured over 250 trading days
preceding the announcement (Return (-252, -2)). We expect a negative coefficient on

Return (-252, -2) in equation (1). We also include Return (-252, -2) in equation (2)
because it has been shown that similar measures of prior performance are negatively
associated with the likelihood of litigation (Jones and Weighram (2005), Gande and
Lewis (2009), Files, Swanson and Tse (2009)).20
The positive relation between a firm’s size and its legal exposure has been well
documented in the legal literature, and is referred to as the “deep pocket” theory (Francis,
Philbrick, and Schipper (1994), Jones and Weingram (1996), and Skinner (1997)).
Because of the fixed costs associated with filing a lawsuit, plaintiffs initiate lawsuits only
if they perceive the recoverable damages to be sufficiently large. Large firms may be
better able to pay damages than a small firm. As a result, firm size measures the capacity
to pay damages. Therefore, we include the variable Size, measured as the logarithm of
market capitalization of the restating firm one year prior to restatement, as a determinant
of the likelihood of litigation. Firm size is also likely to influence market reaction to
restatements because prior studies find that for a given percent change in income, small
companies’ stocks change more than large companies’ stocks (O’Brien and Bhushan
(1990), El-Gazzar (1998)). This is because large firms are followed by more analysts and
investors and consequently earnings surprises are typically small. Therefore, we include
the variable Size in both X1 and X2.
<<<Insert Table 1 here>>>
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Return (-252, -2) can also capture the size of the potential damages.
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4. Data
Restatement dates and characteristics were hand collected from the Lexis-Nexis
and Factiva databases. The Lexis-Nexis and Factiva databases were researched using key
words “restatement,” “restat,” “revis,” “adjust,” “error” and “responding to guidance
from the SEC” in the period January 1, 1997 through June 30, 2002. We selected this
period for two reasons. First, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) made a
sample of restatements announced in this period publicly available. Second, by using
June 30, 2002 as a cut off date, all restatements precede the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and were
therefore made in the same regulatory environment. After identifying the sample of
companies announcing restatements, we collect data describing the restatements from
amended SEC reports (Form 10-K/A and Form 10-Q/A). We collected the following data
from these sources: date of the restatement announcement, years and quarters restated,
and original and restated net income in each period. We obtain accounting and market
variables from COMPUSTAT and return data from CRSP.
We cross-checked our sample with the sample released by the GAO and included
restatements from the GAO sample that were not picked up by the Lexis-Nexis and
Factiva searches.21 In total, we identified 923 restatements or restatement announcements
between 1997 and 2002. Because we are interested in restatements that are attributable to
mistakes or improper interpretation of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP), we excluded 130 restatements that were caused by the adoption of new
accounting rules or changes in accounting method. We also excluded restatements if the
required information needed to define the variables in Table 1 was not available. Within
this category, 187 observations were deleted because data was not available on either
21

The Lexis-Nexis and Factiva searches identified five restatements that were not in the GAO sample.
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CRSP or COMPUSTAT. Other observations were excluded because of missing
information about the restatement itself. The final sample includes 536 restatements and
496 firms. Table 2, Panels A and B present the reasons for excluding restatements from
our sample. Panel C of Table 2 provides information about the number of firms restating
and the distribution of restatement announcements by year. Most of the firms (93%)
restate their financial statements only once in our sample period.
<<<Insert Table 2 here>>>
5. Results

5.1. Sample description and univariate analysis
Table 3, Panel A shows that 180 restating firms (33.58%) were sued as a result of
a restatement. To identify which firms have been sued due to restatements, we searched
for announcements of lawsuits by restating firms in Stanford Securities Class Action
Clearinghouse, Lexis-Nexis and Factiva databases, and checked whether a class period
corresponds to a restatement announcement window. Most lawsuits mention restatement
or accounting problems as a reason for the lawsuit. Class action lawsuits are filed by
plaintiff attorneys on behalf of shareholders. Our rate of litigation is similar to the 37.6%
rate reported by Palmrose and Scholz (2004).22
Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz (2004) and Hennes, Miller, and Leone (2008)
point out that the market reaction to restatements might differ depending on whether a
restatement is due to a simple error or an irregularity.23 We define restatements due to
irregularity using an approach common to these two papers: as restatements subject to

22

Only 19% of restating firms analyzed by Files, Swanson and Tse (2009) were sued.
Note that we exclude restatements due to changes in accounting rules from our sample and therefore our
study is not subject to the criticism by Hennes, Miller, and Leone (2008) of studies that wholly adopt the
GAO sample for restatement studies.
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SEC enforcement actions (AAER) or those that disclose an accounting irregularity or
fraud as the reason for restatement. In our sample, 25.75% of restating firms have been
subject to AAER and 11% report irregularity or fraud as the reason for restatement. In
total, 30% of restating firms in our sample involve irregularity.
Table 3, Panel B, illustrates how litigation and irregularities samples only
partially overlap. Of firms subject to class action lawsuits, 42.22% do not involve
irregularity. Moreover, 36.20% of restatements due to irregularity are not subject to class
action lawsuits. As pointed out by Hennes, Miller, and Leone (2008), lawyers might not
find it beneficial to sue all firms committing an irregularity that results in a restatement
(e.g. smaller firms and limited damages). A chi-square test of the association suggests
that restatements involving an irregularity are more likely to get sued. Therefore, we
control for the effects of irregularities in our analysis.
The majority of restatements are initiated by management (59.33%), with 19.03%
initiated by the SEC and 8.96% by an auditor (Table 3, Panel C). However, these
proportions vary by the sub-sample. The proportion of restatements that are initiated by
an auditor is larger in the sub-sample of firms that are sued. The majority of restatements
involve restatement of at least one annual report (61.57%) as opposed to just quarterly
financial statements. This proportion is higher for the sample of sued firms (66.67%)
compared with the sample of non-sued firms (58.99%) (Table 3, Panel C).
The content of a restatement announcement is very heterogeneous. Some firms
file revised financial statements at the announcement of a restatement. Others mention
only the possibility of a restatement in their initial announcement. In our sample, 40.30%
of the firms did not disclose the full impact of the restatement on financial statements in
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the initial announcement (Table 3, Panel C) and such firms are more likely to be sued.
Eleven percent of the restatements change positive net income to a loss. Approximately
half of all restatements involve core accounts. The percentage of core restatements is
higher in the sued sample than in the non-sued sample (68.89% compared with 41.57%)
(Table 3, Panel C). Table 3, Panel D shows that 77% of lawsuits are filed within one
month of the restatement announcement.
<<<Insert Table 3 here>>>
Table 4, Panel A shows statistics for continuous variables used in the analysis for
the entire sample and Panel B compares sued and non-sued sub-samples. Results in Table
4 are presented for descriptive purposes only. Our main inference is drawn from
simultaneous equation estimation, the results of which are presented in Tables 6-9.
<<<Insert Table 4 here>>>
Table 4, Panel A and B, and Figure 1 show that on average, restating firms have a
negative market reaction of -9.22 percent during a two day window around a restatement
announcement (days zero and plus one), which corresponds to an average loss of $115
million in shareholder wealth.24 This result is consistent with the findings of other
researchers (Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz (2004), GAO (2002)).25 Firms that are
sued have an average CAR01 of -20.58 percent, which represents a loss of $308 million,
compared with an average CAR01 of only -3.67 percent for the non-sued sub-sample,

24

Following Gande and Lewis (2009) we calculate the daily economic dollar effect for firm j on date t as
market capitalization of firm j’s equity on date t-1 times day t abnormal return.
25
Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz (2004) find a 9 percent negative cumulative average abnormal return
around a two-day restatement announcement period in a sample of 403 restatements between 1995 and
1999. GAO, 2002 find a 10 percent negative reaction for a sample of 689 public companies announcing
restatements from 1997 to March 2002.
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which represents a loss of only $21 million.26 The difference in CAR01s for the two subsamples is statistically significant at the 1% level using a Wilcoxon test. The mean

CAR01s for the full sample and both sub-samples are statistically different from zero at
the 1% level.27
Sued firms made more material mistakes and restated more periods than non-sued
firms. Sued firms performed worse than non-sued firms in the year preceding their
restatement announcements. Buy and hold returns calculated over one year prior to the
restatement announcement equals -12.81% for sued firms compared to 1.89% for nonsued firms. The difference is statistically significant. Consistent with the “deep pocket
theory”, we find that sued firms are larger than non-sued firms. The mean market
capitalization is $3,652.44 million for sued firms and $1,451.86 million for non-sued
firms. As expected, sued firms have much higher share turnover one year prior to
restatement. This result is consistent with the findings of Lowry and Shu (2002) and
others. We also find that sued firms have higher cash flow using a one-sided test.28

5.2. Testing the relation between restatement abnormal returns and litigation risk using
Method 1
In this section we describe our main results obtained from estimating equation (1)
using Method 1. Equation (1) is a dummy endogenous variable model and can be

26

These numbers are reported for descriptive purposes only. Because of endogeneity of litigation risk and
restatement announcement returns one cannot use the difference in returns or dollar effects of the sued and
non-sued subsamples to make inference regarding the effect of the expected litigation costs. After
controlling for endogeneity, we estimate that $56 million of shareholder losses can be attributed to
expected litigation costs (See section 5.2 and 5.3).
27
Patell Z test was used to make statistical inference.
28
Results using cash flow variable are discussed in section 5.4.
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estimated using the generated instrumental variable approach described in Wooldridge
(2002, p. 621).
Table 5 shows the results of all steps of the estimation. The first two columns of
Table 5, Model 1, show parameter estimates and Chi Square statistics for the singleequation probit model with the dependent variable Litigation. The model includes all
exogenous variables in the system of equations (1) and (2). The third column shows the
first stage of the 2SLS with Litigation as a dependent variable. The estimated probability
of litigation is included as a regressor, along with all variables in X1 and X2. The last step
estimates a model explaining the CAR01 using the first stage prediction for the litigation
probability and the exogenous variables from X1 (shown in the last column).
We first consider the second stage model of CAR01. As predicted, we find a
negative and significant coefficient estimate on predicted probability of litigation. This
supports the litigation risk hypothesis and suggests that investors expect high litigation
risk firms to bear larger costs due to restatements. A ten percent increase in the likelihood
of litigation decreases announcement period cumulative abnormal return by
approximately 1.47 percent.
Firms that restate net income to a loss have more negative market reactions. The
coefficient estimate on NI crosses loss threshold is -0.049 and is significant at the 10%
level, consistent with Palmrose, Richardson and Sholz (2004). We also find that firms
that do not disclose the full impact of a restatement at the time of the initial
announcement have more negative market reactions to restatements. Firms that restate
more periods have higher CAR01 as suggested by positive coefficient on Number of

periods restated. A potential reason for this result is that more serious errors get caught
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sooner. The estimated coefficient on No_Details is -0.043 and is significant at the 5%
level, consistent with our prediction that more uncertainty about a firm’s prospects
reduces abnormal returns around restatements.
We also find that the market reaction differs between strong and weak performers:

Return (-252, -2) and abnormal returns are negatively related. As predicted, weak
performers experience less negative returns after accounting for litigation risk. This result
is robust to estimating return over the (-252, -45) window, which excludes the period
during which investors apparently start to anticipate a restatement and a lawsuit (Gande
and Lewis (2009), Bardos, Golec and Harding (2011)).
<<<Insert Table 5 here>>>
Now we turn our attention to the probit estimation of Litigation probability (first
two columns of the table). The most important result is that the majority of the measures
of the seriousness of the accounting error affect the litigation probability but not the
abnormal return directly. The coefficient estimates on Core, Irregularity, and Number of

periods restated are all positive and statistically significant in the probit model, meaning
that they increase the probability that a firm will be sued. From that group, only Number

of periods restated is significant in the 2nd stage model of CAR01. Therefore, Core and
Irregularity only affect restatement announcement returns indirectly by increasing the
likelihood of litigation. Although we saw earlier that firms that cross the net loss
threshold experience more negative returns at a restatement announcement, this variable
is not significant in the model for the likelihood of litigation.

No_Details enters the probit model with a significant positive coefficient
estimate. Firms that do not provide full information about the restatement (No_Details =
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1) are significantly more likely to be sued. Because the variable No_Details is significant
in both equations (1) and (2), it affects the abnormal return through two channels.
Investors apparently use No_Details to estimate the probability that a firm will be sued
and to revise their estimates of future earnings and operating performance.
Stock return performance prior to restatement has different, and partially
offsetting impacts on the likelihood of litigation and CAR01. The results show that weak
performance increases the likelihood of litigation (thereby indirectly lowering the
abnormal return), but also directly increases abnormal returns. The increase in litigation
probability is consistent with Gande and Lewis (2009) and Jones and Weingram (1996),
who show that lawyers target poor performers.
Finally, the probit shows that larger firms are more likely to be sued, consistent
with the notion that deep pockets attract more lawsuits. Greater share turnover
significantly increases the likelihood of litigation. Note that the coefficient on share
turnover is highly significant in the probit model, suggesting that it is a strong instrument.

5.3. Re-estimating the relations using Method 2
To check the robustness of our results, we estimate the system of equations (1)
and (2) using the method described in Heckman (1978). The results are very similar to
those obtained using Method 1 and are not shown for brevity. The only difference is that
the estimates using Method 2 provide weak evidence that firms whose restatements are
initiated by the SEC are less likely to be sued. One possible explanation for this result is
that restatements initiated by the SEC are more technical in nature and are more likely to
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result from misinterpretation of GAAP rather than serious mistakes (Palmrose,
Richardson and Scholz (2004)).

5.4. Sensitivity analysis
To further test the robustness of our results, we perform a number of sensitivity
tests. First, we use cash flow instead of firm size to proxy for the capacity to pay
damages. Following Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004), we define cash flow as
operating income before extraordinary items and deprecation, less dividends.29 An
advantage to using the cash flow measure is that it has statistically insignificant
correlation of less than 1% with share turnover, while firm size has a small positive
correlation of 0.28.30
Table 6 shows our main model, replacing firm size with cash flow. The results are
largely unchanged. We continue to find a positive and highly significant association
between share turnover and the likelihood of litigation. The insignificant estimate on cash
flow is not surprising because cash flow is much noisier over time than size. The
coefficient estimate on our main variable of interest, predicted probability of litigation,
remains negative and significant and is similar in magnitude to that found in Table 5.
<<<Insert Table 6 here>>>

29

Our results are robust to using two other definitions of cash flows. Our second definition follows Dechow
(1994), Gatchev, Pulvino and Tarhan (2010) among others, and calculates cash flow as operating income
before depreciation less net interest expense less cash taxes less the change in net working capital. Net
working capital is defined as ((total current assets – cash and equivalents) – (total current liabilities – debt
in current liabilities)). Lastly, we define cash flow as income before extraordinary items plus depreciation
and amortization and plus deferred taxes, as in Moyen (2004). In the paper, we report the results using cash
flow measure that has the least number of missing observations.
30
The coefficient on share turnover and the rest of the results are not affected by elimination of firm size
suggesting little effect from multicollinierity.

27

Second, because Change in NI/Total_assets is not available for firms that did not
disclose full details about their restatements, we repeat the analysis including the
interaction of No_Details with Change in NI/Total_assets. We report the results in Table
7. Our results are basically unchanged.
<<<Insert Table 7 here>>>
We also explored other model specifications which we discuss here but for space
reasons do not provide full model details. We distinguish between restatements of annual
reports and restatements of only quarterly reports by including a dummy variable Annual.

Annual equals one if a restatement includes a revision of at least one annual report; and
zero otherwise. Since annual financial statements are audited by a third party, their
restatements are inherently different. We exclude Number of periods restated from this
specification because it is highly correlated with Annual. We find that abnormal returns
do not differ between restatements of annual and quarterly reports, and the predictive
power of other variables is unchanged.
We also replicate our results using a more robust measure of firm performance
prior to restatement announcement. We replace Return (-252, -2) with buy-and-hold
abnormal returns of restating firms relative to a sample of control firms for the fourth
quarter of the error period.31 The control firms were selected to match the restating firms
in terms of size and book-to-market ratio one year before the first mistake is made. The
sample size drops to 380 restatements because of the missing data necessary for
matching, but the results remain robust to using this measure of prior firm performance.
31

The error period is defined as the period between the start of the first year or quarter restated and the
restatement announcement date. The total error period is then divided into fourths. Thus the term quarter
as used here does not refer to a calendar quarter, but a time period equal to 1/4th of the error period. For
example, if the company made a mistake in 1997 and announced a restatement of its 1997 annual report on
March 15, 1998, the error period would span January 1, 1997 – March 15, 1998 and equal 1.20 years.
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Prior literature suggested that volatility of returns prior to disclosure of
irregularity can also determine litigation. We find that sued and non-sued firms do not
differ with respect to volatility of stock return calculated over the year prior to
restatement announcement.32 Gande and Lewis (2009) and Bradley, Cline and Lian
(2010) also find that volatility is not a significant predictor of litigation. We rerun our
models including volatility and find that consistent with univariate analysis the
coefficient estimate on volatility is not significant in determining the likelihood of
litigation and the on other estimates are not affected.
Next, we re-estimate the models excluding second and third restatements by the
same firm. Announcement of the first restatement by the firm is likely to have a much
larger impact on its stock price. In fact, several firms, such as Rite Aid, that announced
several restatements in our sample period restate the same 10-Ks and 10-Qs several
times. The first restatement announcement is likely to undermine the confidence of
investors in the quality of firm’s financial statements and management’s competence
more than the second and third restatements. Again, results for this slightly smaller
sample are little changed.
We also control for restatements that affect only the timing of income recognition
by including a dummy variable to identify Timing restatements. Such restatements do not
impact the value of past cash flows or earnings and therefore should have less negative
announcement period abnormal returns. We find that the coefficient estimates on Timing
are statistically insignificant.

32

Volatility is calculated as the daily standard deviation of the rate of return over the one year prior to the
restatement announcement.
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Most litigation studies find that firms in financial, technology, retail and highly
regulated industries are more likely to be sued. When we include dummy variables for
these industries in the models for litigation risk none are significant predictors of
litigation and the rest of the results are unaffected.

6. Conclusion
Litigation imposes substantial costs on firms. Attorney fees, the costs of
management time allocated to the lawsuit, reputation costs, and settlement costs represent
a large potential liability for restating firms. When firms announce restatements, it is
likely that investors simultaneously assess the implication of restatements for firm
operations as well as potential litigation costs. This paper focuses on the litigation risk
effect using a simultaneous equations model to account for endogeneity.
Results show that firms with higher litigation risk have much larger negative
market reactions to restatement announcements, controlling for other determinants of
market reaction. A ten percent increase in the likelihood of litigation decreases
announcement period cumulative abnormal return by approximately 1.43 percent. We
also find that most measures of the seriousness of the accounting errors directly affect
only the probability of being sued, not the magnitude of the restatement announcement
abnormal return. The seriousness of the restatement only affects the restatement
announcement abnormal return indirectly by increasing the probability of litigation.
We show in Figure 1.B that sued restating firms experience negative abnormal
returns over the 30 trading days prior to the announcement. Investors apparently start
learning that the firm has serious undisclosed problems well before the restatement. A
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restatement announcement can produce additional large negative abnormal returns if it
provides information that investors interpret as raising the likelihood of costly litigation.
The restatement announcement is a large negative surprise, not because it informs
investors much about the true (weaker) financial state of the firm, but because it sheds
new light on the likelihood that the firm will be sued and will have to bear significant
litigation costs.
Our results have implications for prior studies of restatement announcements that
do not account for litigation risk. For example, the large negative abnormal returns
reported in earlier studies do not necessarily imply that most restating firms committed
egregious accounting errors, and that disclosure regulations should therefore be tightened.
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Figure 1: Cumulative abnormal returns around restatement announcement
Figures show market model cumulative average abnormal return for 60 days surrounding restatement
announcements. Market model parameters are estimated over a 250 day period starting on day -46 relative
to restatement.
Figure 1.A. Full sample
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Table 1: Definition of variables
This table defines variables that are used to identify equations (1) and (2). Z is a vector of instrumental variables
for predicting the likelihood of litigation and is part of X2 but not X1. Variables are listed in alphabetical order.
CAR01 = γ1 Litigation risk + β1 X1 + ε1
(1)
Litigation risk = γ2 CAR01 + β2 X2 + ε 2
(2)
Variable name Variable definition
Annual
A dummy variable that equals one if restatement includes a revision of at least one
annual report; and equals zero if only quarterly financial statements were restated.
Auditor
A dummy that equals one if auditor initiated restatement.

Matrix
X1 and X2
X1 and X2

CAR01

Market model cumulative abnormal return for days zero and plus one relative to
restatement. Market model is estimated over a 250 day period starting on day -46
relative to restatement using value-weighted CRSP index of NYSE, AMEX, and
NASDAQ companies.
Cash Flow
Operating income before extraordinary items and deprecation less dividends. This
variable is winzorized at 5% due to high skewness.
Change in
The difference between average annual restated Net Income and average annual
NI/Total_assets originally reported Net Income divided by total assets reported for the fiscal year
preceding the restatement announcement. Average annual restated (originally
reported) Net Income is calculated as total restated (originally reported) Net Income
divided by Number of Periods Restated and multiplied by 4.
Company
A dummy that equals one if company’s management initiated restatement.

X1 and X2
X1 and X2

Core

X1 and X2

A dummy that equals one if a restatement involved revenue, cost of sales or
operating expense accounts for on-going operations, and zero otherwise.
Irregularity
A dummy that equals one if the company announced fraud or an irregularity as a
reason for restatement or if restating firm was subject to AAER as a result of a
restatement.
Litigation
Dummy that equals one if the firm was sued because of restatement in class action
lawsuit.
No_Details
A dummy that equals one if full details about a restatement were not released in the
initial announcement.
NI crosses loss Takes a value of one if restatement changes reported income into loss and zero
threshold
otherwise.
Number of
The number of periods restated in years. If the firm restated one annual report, this
periods restated variable will equal 1. If the firm restated one annual report and one quarterly report,
this variable will equal 1.25.
SEC
A dummy that equals one if SEC initiated restatement.
Return
(-252, -2)
Share turnover
Size

X1 and X2
X1 and X2

X1 and X2

X1 and X2
X1 and X2
X1 and X2
X1 and X2

Buy and hold stock return, measured over one year estimation period preceding
X1 and X2
restatement announcement date.
Probability that a share was traded within a given time period. It is calculated as: [1Z
Пt (1- volume tradedt / total sharest)] accumulated over the one-year period ending
on the second day prior to the restatement announcement date.
Logarithm of the market capitalization of restating firm one year prior to
X1 and X2
restatement.
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Table 2. Restatement sample description
Restatement dates and characteristics were hand collected from the Lexis-Nexis and Factiva databases. The LexisNexis and Factiva databases were searched using key words “restatement” “restat” “revis” “adjust” “error” and
“responding to guidance from the SEC” during the period January 1, 1997 - June 30, 2002. We cross checked our
sample with the sample released by the GAO. Unlike the GAO sample, we excluded restatements that were caused
by an adoption of new accounting rules, and retained only restatements due to a mistake or an improper
interpretation of GAAP rules. After identifying the sample of companies announcing restatements, we find further
data on restatements in amended statements (Form 10-K/A(s) and Form 10-Q/A(s)).
Panel A: Sample selection
Source
GAO sample
Less deleted restatements

Number of restatements
918
387
531
5
536

Additional restatements
Total sample
Panel B: Reasons for deleting GAO restatements
Reason for deleting
Data not available on either CRSP or Compustat
New rule adoption
In the sample period, companies adopted the following rules FASB 101, FASB 133,
EIC-113, EITF 00-10, EITF 00-14, FASB 142, etc. Approximately 50% of new rule
adoption restatements are due to adoption of FASB 101 revenue recognition rule.
Change in method of accounting
No restatement was made despite the announcement of a possibility of restatement
No information found regarding restatement
Other*

Panel C: Number of restatements and restating firms
Number of restatements by
same firm in the sample period
Number of restating firms
1
461
2
30
3
5
496

Number of restatements
187
114

16
20
25
25
387

Number of restatements
461
60
15
536

Panel D: Restatements by year
Year
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002 (through June 30, 2002)

Number of restatements
64
70
120
125
82
75
536
*16 of the restatement announcements in GAO sample were not announcements of new restatements, but rather
releases of new information regarding already announced restatement. We deleted such announcements. This category
also includes restatements that were not a result of a mistake or a misinterpretation of accounting rules (for example
restatements due to changes in the number of shares).
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Table 3: Restatement sample summary statistics of binary variables
This table shows summary statistics for binary variables for a sample of firms restating financial statements during the
period of January 1, 1997 - June 30, 2002. Litigation is a dummy that equals one if the firm was sued because of a
restatement. We search for the announcement of a class action lawsuit in Lexis-Nexis and Factiva and check whether
the announcement specially mentions restatement as a reason for the lawsuit. Irregularity is a dummy that equals one
if the company announced fraud or an irregularity as a reason for restatement or if restating firm was subject to AAER
as a result of a restatement. Auditor, SEC and Management are dummy variables that equal one if restatements were
initiated by auditor, SEC and management, respectively. Annual is a dummy variable that equals one if restatement
includes a revision of at least one annual report; and equals zero if only quarterly financial statements were restated.
Quarterly is a dummy that equals one when Annual=0. No_Details is a dummy that equals one if full details about a
restatement were not released in the initial announcement. NI crosses loss threshold equals one if a restatement
changes reported income into a loss and equals zero otherwise. Core is a dummy that equals one if a restatement
involved revenue, cost of sales or operating expense accounts for on-going operations, and equals zero otherwise. The
difference in sub-samples in Panel B is tested using a chi-square test of association *, **, and *** indicate
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Panel A: Litigation and irregularity
Characteristic
Litigation
Irregularity
AAER
Firm discloses irregularity or fraud

Yes
180
163
138
59

No
356
373
398
477

as a %
33.58%
30.04%
25.75%
11.01%

as a %
66.42%
69.59%
74.25%
88.99%

Panel B: Litigation and irregularity cross frequency
Number of
Litigation
Irregularity
restatements
Yes
Yes
104
Yes
No
76
No
Yes
59
No
No
297
Chi-square test of association = 95.91 (p-value<0.01)

As a percent of total
(536)
19.40%
14.18%
11.01%
55.41%

As a percent of
Litigation=Yes
(180)
57.78%
42.22%
N/A
N/A

As a percent of
Irregularity=Yes
(163)
63.80%
N/A
36.20%
N/A

Panel C: Description of dummy variables for restatements with and without litigation
Full sample (N=536)
With litigation (N=180)
No litigation (N=356)
Chi-square
test of
association
2.73*

Number of
restatements
48
102
318

as a % of
536
8.96%
19.03%
59.33%

Number of
restatements
43
24
33

as a % of
180
23.89%
13.33%
18.33%

Number of
restatements
24
69
196

as a %
of 356
6.74%
19.38%
55.06%

Annual
Quarterly

330
206

61.57%
38.43%

120
60

66.67%
33.33%

210
146

58.99%
41.01%

2.98*

No_Details
NI crosses loss
threshold
Core

216

40.30%

108

60.00%

108

30.34%

30.18***

60
272

11.19%
50.75%

25
124

13.89%
68.89%

35
148

9.83%
41.57%

1.98
20.35***

Binary variables
Auditor
SEC
Company
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Table 3 (continued): Restatement sample summary statistics of binary variables
Panel D: Number of days between restatement and litigation announcements
Number of Calendar Days between
Restatement and Litigation Announcements
0
1
2
3
4
less than 30
less than 60
less than 90

Number of
restatements
18
28
13
10
7
139
151
160

As a %
10%
16%
7%
6%
4%
77%
84%
89%
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Table 4: Restatement sample summary statistics of continuous variables
This table describes the continuous variables for a sample of firms restating financial statements during the period of January 1, 1997 - June 30, 2002. CAR01 is a
market model cumulative abnormal return for days zero and plus one relative to a restatement announcement. Market model parameters are estimated over a 250 day
period starting on day -46 relative to restatement using value weighted market index. Change in NI/Total_assets is the difference between restated Net Income and
originally reported Net Income divided by total assets reported in the year preceding restatement announcement. If more than one period is restated, Net Income for
all restated periods is added up. Number of periods restated is the number of periods restated in years. If the firm restated one annual report, this variable will equal 1.
If the firm restated one annual report and one quarterly report, this variable will equal 1.25. Return (-252, -2) is the buy and hold stock return, measured over the one
year period preceding the restatement announcement date. Size is the market capitalization reported at the year end prior to the restatement announcement. Share
turnover is the probability that a share was traded within a given time period. It is calculated as: [1- Пt (1- volume tradedt / total sharest)] accumulated over the oneyear period ending on the second day prior to the restatement announcement date. Cash flow equals operating income before extraordinary items and deprecation
less dividends, and is winzorized at 5%. The Wilcoxon Test tests for significant differences between sued and non-sued restating firms. *, **, and *** indicate
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Panel A: Full sample
Variables
CAR01
Change in NI/Total_assets
Number of periods restated
Return (-252, -2)
Size (in millions)
Share turnover
Cash flow (in millions)

Mean
-9.22%
-5.06
1.37
-2.99%
2,173.65
0.679
106.28

Panel B: Comparison of sued and non-sued sub-samples
Sued restating firms
Variables
Mean
Median
Std Dev
CAR01
-20.58%
-16.17%
22.74%
Change in NI/Total_assets
-0.442
-0.070
2.006
Number of periods restated
1.622
1.250
1.136
Return (-252, -2)
-12.81%
-41.47%
202.60%
Size (in millions)
3,652.44
288.54
12,935.32
Share turnover
0.818
0.903
0.203
Cash flow (in millions)
133.93
13.13
258.64

Median
-3.93%
-0.04
1.00
-23.47%
182.87
0.733
9.53

N
166
162
180
174
164
174
161

Std Dev
18.05%
75.05
1.05
143.25%
8,906.85
0.270
235.07

Non-sued restating firms
Mean
Median
Std Dev
-3.67%
-2.02%
11.81%
-7.314
-0.024
91.495
1.242
1.000
0.983
1.89%
-17.78% 101.66%
1,451.86
132.52
5,929.78
0.611
0.630
0.273
92.83
7.60
221.87

N
506
494
536
524
500
524
492

N
340
332
356
350
336
350
331

Wilcoxon test
-9.28***
-4.92***
3.88***
-4.31***
4.38***
8.55***
1.53*
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Table 5: Determinants of market reaction to restatements using method 1 (Model 1)
This table examines the determinants of market reaction to restatements controlling for litigation risk using a simultaneous-equation
approach, where announcement period cumulative abnormal return (CAR01) and litigation probability are treated as endogenous
variables (see Wooldridge, 2002). The first step estimates the probability of litigation using a maximum likelihood probit model:
Probability(Litigation = 1| X1 , X2). The model is used to generate a first step predicted probability of being sued for each restating
^

firm, G i . The next step estimates the system of equations, (1) and (2), using two-stage least squares (2SLS). The first stage of the
^

2SLS estimation is a regression of the dummy variable Litigation on

G i , X1 , and X2, which is used to generate a second version of

^

the predicted probability of litigation, denoted

P (Litigation). The second stage of the 2SLS procedure estimates equation (1) by

^

OLS after substituting P (Litigation) for Litigation, and produces 2SLS standard errors. Please refer to Table 1 for variable
definitions. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Probit ML

2SLS

2SLS

Dependent
variable=Litigation

1st Stage
Dependent
variable=Litigation

2nd Stage
Dependent variable=CAR01

Estimated Chi
coefficient Square

Explanatory variables

Estimated
coefficient T values

Predicted Estimated
sign
coefficient T values

^

P (Litigation)

-

-0.147

-2.78***

+
+
Control
Control

0.000
-0.049
0.014
-0.007
-0.010
-0.034
-0.008
-0.023
-0.043
-0.018
0.007
-0.016

-1.30
-1.88*
1.82*
-0.42
-0.40
-0.96
-0.30
-0.92
-2.38**
-3.43***
1.58
-0.66

^

Predicted probability of litigation

Gi

0.993

3.74***

Restatement and firm characteristics:
Change in NI/Total_assets
NI crosses loss threshold
Number of periods restated
Irregularity
Core
Auditor
SEC
Company
No_Details
Return (-252, -2)
Size
Intercept

0.001
0.346
0.163
1.094
0.377
0.283
-0.370
0.227
0.343
-0.098
0.094
-3.603

0.02
2.34
4.90**
50.96***
6.26***
0.68
1.58
0.79
5.18**
5.11**
5.91**
77.45***

0.000
0.000
-0.001
0.003
0.005
-0.009
-0.007
-0.001
0.007
0.002
-0.001
0.002

-0.01
0.00
-0.03
0.06
0.05
-0.11
-0.09
-0.02
0.15
0.12
-0.12
0.01

Instrument for Probability of Litigation:
Share turnover

2.124

43.45***

0.013

0.08

Number of Observations
Adjusted R squared
F statistic [Log Likelihood]

483
[-207.92]

483
35.03%
20.99***

464
11.38%
6.40***
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Table 6: Determinants of market reaction to restatements using method 1 (Model 2)
Model 2 replaces firm size with cash flow.
This table uses Method 1 described in the legend to Table 5 and differs from Table 5 in that it replaces Size with Cash flow. See Table
1 for variable definitions and the legend in Table 5 for the description of the simultaneous-equation approach used in the estimation.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Probit ML

2SLS

2SLS

Dependent
variable=Litigation

1st Stage
Dependent
variable=Litigation

2nd Stage
Dependent variable=CAR01

Estimated Chi
coefficient Square

Explanatory variables

Estimated
coefficient T values

Predicted Estimated
sign
coefficient T values

^

P (Litigation)

-

-0.131

-2.71***

+
+
Control
Control

0.000
-0.046
0.013
-0.005
-0.016
-0.023
-0.009
-0.025
-0.040
-0.017
0.0001
-0.025

-1.29
-1.84*
1.62
-0.3
-0.62
-0.62
-0.31
-1.02
-2.24**
-3.37***
1.58
-1.01

^

Predicted probability of litigation

Gi

1.065

3.79***

Restatement and firm characteristics:
Change in NI/Total_assets
NI crosses loss threshold
Number of periods restated
Irregularity
Core
Auditor
SEC
Company
No_Details
Return (-252, -2)
Cash flow
Intercept

0.001
0.269
0.156
1.108
0.345
0.292
-0.336
0.161
0.325
-0.085
0.0003
-3.173

0.02
1.46
4.25**
51.11***
5.34**
0.72
1.33
0.42
4.64**
3.85**
0.73
78.96***

0.000
-0.005
-0.004
-0.003
-0.021
-0.011
0.001
-0.001
0.000
0.003
0.000
0.017

0.00
-0.08
-0.17
-0.06
-0.20
-0.12
0.01
-0.02
0.00
0.24
-0.04
0.16

Instrument for Probability of Litigation:
Share turnover

2.311

53.55***

-0.031

-0.18

Number of Observations
Adjusted R squared
F statistic [Log Likelihood]

476
[-208.72]

476
33.75%
19.62***

457
11.06%
5.73***
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Table 7: Determinants of the market reaction to restatements using method 1 (Model 3)
Model 3 includes interaction of No_Details and Change in NI/Total_assets
This table uses Method 1 described in the legend to Table 5 and differs from Table 5 in that it adds the interaction of the variables
No_Details and Change in NI/Total_assets. See Table 1 for variable definitions and the legend in Table 5 for the description of the
simultaneous-equation approach used in the estimation. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Probit ML

2SLS

2SLS

Dependent
variable=Litigation

1st Stage
Dependent
variable=Litigation

2nd Stage
Dependent variable=CAR01

Estimated Chi
coefficient Square

Explanatory variables

Estimated
coefficient T values

Predicted Estimated
sign
coefficient T values

^

P (Litigation)

-

-0.147

-2.77***

+
+
Control
Control

0.000
-0.049
0.015
-0.008
-0.010
-0.033
-0.009
-0.023
-0.042
0.001
-0.018
0.007
-0.052

-1.31
-1.88*
1.83*
-0.43
-0.41
-0.92
-0.3
-0.92
-2.36**
0.24
-3.43***
1.58
-1.55

^

Predicted probability of litigation

Gi

0.984

3.70***

Restatement and firm characteristics:
Change in NI/Total_assets
NI crosses loss threshold
Number of periods restated
Irregularity
Core
Auditor
SEC
Company
No_Details
No_Details*(Change in NI/Total_assets)
Return (-252, -2)
Size
Intercept

0.000
0.347
0.166
1.090
0.375
0.300
-0.373
0.228
0.346
0.026
-0.099
0.094
-3.607

0.01
2.35
5.04**
50.44***
6.17***
0.76
1.61
0.80
5.26**
0.16
5.14**
5.99***
77.62***

0.017
0.000
0.001
0.000
0.003
0.007
-0.009
-0.007
-0.001
0.007
0.000
0.001
-0.001

0.11
-0.02
0.01
-0.02
0.08
0.08
-0.1
-0.1
-0.01
0.16
-0.03
0.11
-0.11

Instrument for Probability of Litigation:
Share turnover

2.121

43.38***

0.017

0.11

Number of Observations
Adjusted R squared
F statistic [Log Likelihood]

483
[-207.78]

483
34.91%
19.46***

463
11.47%
5.61***
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